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I. Introduction 
From the mid-1980’s to the early 2000’s the wide-ranging resources of the 
concept we now call sensitivity, which Robert Nozick used to give an analysis of the 
concepts of knowledge and evidence, went largely unappreciated in epistemology. This 
was in part because these resources were upstaged by a glamorous implication the 
condition has for skepticism, and in part because of loss of faith in the project of giving a 
theory of knowledge at all, due to the failure time and again to construct a theory without 
counterexamples. The sensitivity condition, or as Nozick called it the variation condition, 
which requires that were p to be false you wouldn’t believe it, had its own apparent 
counterexamples. And while the implication of this condition for skepticism was elegant 
and principled – it is possible to know that there is a table in front of you without knowing 
you are not a brain in a vat – it had the price of denying closure of knowledge under 
known implication, that is, denying that knowing q and knowing that q implies p are 
together sufficient to make the belief in p that you have on that basis knowledge. Many 
felt this was too much to pay for what seemed to be the sensitivity condition’s primary 
selling point. 
 However, the sensitivity condition need not prevent closure if it is not taken as a 
necessary condition for knowledge.  Drawn to that move’s exciting implications about 
skepticism, no one gave an argument for taking the condition as necessary. Conditions 
can figure in lots of different ways in the definition of a concept. Sensitivity was already 
imagined as only one of a set of necessary conditions for knowledge of p, each 
independent of the others, including belief in p, the truth of p (and in Nozick’s theory 
adherence to p). Why should a definition have exactly this many but no more independent 
clauses? One might reply that closure should not be a property that is independent of the 
property of knowledge that goes beyond truth and belief; it should follow from that 
property. The weakness of this reply is that it is grounds for rejecting other theories too; 
few if any of the major theories of knowledge of recent times have that feature.1  
 Alvin Goldman was aware of this fact about his process reliabilist condition on 
justified belief (and thereby knowledge) from the inception of his theory. That one’s true 
belief in q was formed by a reliable process, and that one’s valid deduction of p from q 
was reliably formed, do not together imply that one’s belief in p so formed was formed by 
a reliable process. This is because reliability of a process is not defined as requiring 
infallibility, even for deduction, and wherever one sets the threshold, two processes that 
are just above the threshold can concatenate to one process whose reliability dips below 
it, due to the presence of double the sources of error. For this reason Goldman did what 
any rational person who subscribes to the closure of knowledge or justified belief would; 
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he introduced a recursion clause, allowing that one has a justified belief if either one’s 
belief was formed by a reliable process or it was formed by application of a conditionally 
reliable process to a justified belief (Goldman 2008, 340-341). 
In internalist views of justification (and potentially, thereby, knowledge) the 
conditions imposed on the concept(s) are sometimes not defined explicitly enough to 
deductively imply a verdict one way or the other on closure, or are explicitly defined and 
do not have an implication one way or the other. (I will deal with Tony Brueckner’s 
example of an internalist view that does imply closure below.) Intuitive arguments, of 
which there are many, can be taken to provide reasons to add closure as an independent 
requirement in an internalist view of knowledge, but those intuitions are available to 
externalists too. That sensitivity does not imply closure, and taken as a necessary 
condition easily brings failure of closure, is not a good argument for its being less 
adequate than other conditions. 
In other places (Roush 2005, 2009, 2010a) I have developed, through examination 
of a number of issues, what I see as the extensive explanatory resources in the concept of 
sensitivity when it is combined with adherence. Here I will focus on the consequences of 
the move I made of combining sensitivity (and adherence) with closure via a recursion 
clause. My imposition of closure on a sensitivity-based view of knowledge has seemed to 
some unexplanatory and to lead to cheap knowledge. I will argue that as it stands the 
view is no less explanatory, and leads to no more cheap knowledge, than other views. 
However, my main objective here is to explain why these issues depend very much on the 
formulation of the closure clause and to present a new formulation. The new view does 
not have problems with explanation or cheap knowledge, and I will use it to explain how 
the problem of closure is entirely provoked and resolved by attention to the growth of 
potential error.    
My theory of knowledge is a refiguring of Nozick’s theory that uses probability 
rather than counterfactuals, and in which the sensitivity condition is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition. Schematically, it is sufficient for subject S to know p, a 
contingent proposition, if p is true, she believes p, and: 
 
1)  P(–b(p)∕ –p) > s, where s  1 and 
 
2)  P(b(p)∕p) > t, where t  1, 
 
That is, the probabilities are high that she does not believe p given that p is false and that 
she does believe p given that it is true. s and t are thresholds determined by the disutility 
of false positive and false negative errors respectively for the one who is evaluating 
whether S knows that p, who may or may not be S herself. “” rather than “<” 
accommodates the possibility of an evaluator who has infallibilist utilities. For anyone 
living outside bizarro world, s and t will be greater than .5.2 
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There are several reasons why this formulation of sensitivity in terms of 
conditional probability is superior to the counterfactual version requiring that if p were 
false the subject wouldn’t believe p. Typically a similarity relation is used to determine 
which set of possible worlds matters in the evaluation of a counterfactual; we want to 
know whether the consequent is true in the world(s) where the antecedent is true that are 
most similar to the actual world. With sensitivity this means we want to know whether the 
person believes p in the –p world(s) most similar to the actual world. Defining a similarity 
relation in a principled way so as to match the expectations of an epistemic sensitivity 
property has been elusive, the best accounts giving a list piecemeal, and even if one 
achieved a match it would be hard to avoid an air of arbitrariness, since everything is 
similar to everything else in some respect. However, with a conditional probability 
approach there is no restriction on which sets of values for other propositions that are 
compatible with –p, that is, which possible –p scenarios, are taken into account. All go 
into the weighted average that determines the value of the conditional probability in 1. 
Still these sets of –p-compatible values for other propositions only contribute to the 
evaluation in proportion to their probability; only the probable –p scenarios make a 
significant difference to the value of the conditional probability.  
We thus eliminate the need for an extra similarity relation to carefully carve out 
the set of scenarios that matter; they all do. Yet the impossibility of knowledge does not 
follow, since not only do less probable scenarios make a smaller difference, but also 
because of the threshold in condition 1, –p scenarios whose probability is below 1-s, s<1, 
will not make any difference at all to whether one has knowledge. It is only if we are 
infallibilists (with s = 1) that no scenario’s probability is too low to prevent its having an 
effect. Not only does this seem less artificial than trying to draw a line around a certain 
set of possibilities just so, but it seems to me that similarity is not the gist of what makes a 
possibility matter epistemically. Imagine you know there is a tree in front of you because 
you are looking at it. Now imagine a possible scenario in which a very special, tiny, 
cosmic ray hits the tree. It vaporizes the tree and stops to sit there in the space that is left 
behind. Moreover, this cosmic ray has properties that sometimes make it look much 
larger than it is. In fact, in the possible world we are considering it looks just like a full-
sized tree when viewed from your distance.  
The laws of physics would not need to be different, or breached, for this cosmic 
ray to be possible. The laws are probabilistic and allow for highly improbable 
occurrences. In fact the possible world described is only negligibly different from the 
actual world in the matters that go beyond p. It is surely much more similar to the actual 
world – not only in the eyes of a beholder of the tree, but also plain physically – than is a 
world in which the tree is not there because landscapers come with big equipment and a 
truck and cut it down, dig it up, and haul it away. I think we would expect you to refrain 
from believing there is a tree there in a world in which it has been hauled away. But I 
think we would also say the possibility of a cosmic ray that looks like a tree does not 
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undermine your knowledge that there is a tree in front of you when you are looking at it. 
The reason, I think, is that the world described is too improbable to matter. In judging 
whether we have knowledge we seem to care more about what our belief behavior would 
be in those possible scenarios we have a good chance of bumping into, than about 
whether the possibilities are similar.  
Neither of conditions 1 and 2 is necessary for knowledge because on the new 
tracking view defined in Roush (2005), one can know p not only by tracking p (fulfilling 
1 and 2), but also by believing p and knowing something that one knows implies p (and 
basing one’s belief in p on all of that). Thus, schematically, S knows p, a contingent 
proposition, if and only if S believes p, p is true, and either: 
 
S tracks p (fulfills 1 and 2) 
or 
there are q1, …, qn, such that q1, …, qn together imply p, S knows that q1, …, qn 
imply p, and S knows q1, …, qn.3  
 
This is not yet the definition of knowledge, since the conditional probabilities in 1 and 2 
are not determinate for reasons I will discuss below in connection with the generality 
problem (hence the persistent qualifier “schematically”), but it gives the idea for current 
purposes. I have also since changed the recursion clause in this definition, for important 
reasons I will discuss below. The discussion up to that point is independent of those 
changes. 
 
II. Knowledge Of Logical Truth 
Obviously a definition of knowledge of logical implication is needed to complete 
the recursion clause and the (schematic) definition of knowledge. The sensitivity 
condition has the well-known problem of being undefined for logical truths because their 
negations are impossible, and counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are prima facie 
undefined. The problem is hard to fix, and it does not go away in the re-formulation by 
conditional probability. However, the idea of sensitivity is broader than this. It expects 
that when we have knowledge we are being responsive to the way things are. Necessary 
truths are different from empirical truths – at least they are being treated as radically 
different if we take their negations to be impossible and their probabilities to be 0, the 
only circumstance in which this problem arises in the first place – so it should be no 
surprise if the kind of responsiveness we should expect for knowledge of logical truths 
and other necessary truths takes a different form. 
The truth value of a logical truth is the same no matter what, namely true, and this 
has trivialized several otherwise promising theories of knowledge (see Roush 2005, 134-
36). For example, the necessity of a logical truth means that you wouldn’t, indeed 
couldn’t, easily believe it and be wrong; a belief in it is automatically safe. However, a 
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logical truth’s being true no matter what does not imply that a belief in it is responsive to 
it, even at the intuitive level. One can believe a proposition without proper appreciation of 
its truth.  
What could appreciation or responsiveness to a logical truth be when the truth 
value is the same no matter what? One might think that it would simply be believing it no 
matter what, and that is not a bad idea. Consider that this condition is not trivialized by 
the necessity of the logical truth. The facts that you actually believe p and that p is true no 
matter what do not imply that you believe it no matter what. The latter is requiring not 
just a belief but a disposition to believe, the fact that a certain belief would be present in a 
large set of possible scenarios. Believing no matter what is not my analysis of responsive 
to logical truths, but it is in the neighborhood.  
What we need to appreciate about logical truths is the way that they impose 
relations between propositions, and thereby impose requirements on the relations between 
our beliefs. Your belief states toward propositions should comply with those relations 
even when they are not determined by them. For example, if contingent q implies 
contingent p and someone believes q, but were he to form a belief in q he would still not 
believe p, then we would have to say that he does not know that q implies p. If, were he to 
give up belief in p he would retain belief in q, he surely would also fail to know the 
implication. Implication is a relation, so to appreciate a logical truth that is an implication 
claim your belief states toward the propositions on either side of that relation must be 
responsive to each other. Thus, I say the key extra feature beyond true belief in knowing 
that q1, …, qn imply p is fulfillment of the following conditions: 
 
3’)  P((–b(q1)  …  –b(qn))/ –b(p))  >  u   1 
 
4’)  P(b(p)/(b(q1) . … . b(qn)) >  v   1 
 
where u and v are thresholds that depend on the error tolerances of the evaluator, as 
above. If you know the implication, then by 3’ the probability that you do not have one of 
the qi beliefs given that you do not have a belief in p is high. Similarly, if you know the 
implication then the probability you believe p given that you have beliefs in all of q1 
through qn is high.  
Tony Brueckner objects to this definition on the grounds that a subject’s 
fulfillment of these conditions merely “attest[s] to the firmness of his belief that the 
implication holds” (Brueckner, “Roush on Knowledge: Tracking Redux?” this volume, 
##; hereafter ‘RKTR’). But this is a false description of the conditions, for they are not 
properties of the subject’s belief in the implication at all. In fact the belief in the 
implication and properties 3’ and 4’ are logically independent, for a person may behave 
as if the implication is true, withdrawing and according credence to some of the p’s and 
q’s according as his credences in others of them change, without having a belief in the 
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proposition “q1, …, qn imply p,” and vice versa.  If a belief is a disposition to act – my 
preferred way of thinking about it – we could say that the subject’s patterns of willingness 
or unwillingness to act on p when he is willing or unwilling to act on q1, …, qn  are 
distinct from his willingness or unwillingness to act on the claim that q1, …, qn imply p. 
For a simple example, imagine someone who does not have the concept of logical 
implication.4 
Brueckner’s example of the supermarket tabloid trades on the same confusion. He 
imagines that I have what he calls a “firm” belief that the implication holds, that I got 
from a screaming National Enquirer headline, and takes firmness of that belief to be the 
same as satisfaction of 3’ and 4’. But this cannot be so because 3’ and 4’ are not 
properties of the implication belief. “Firmness” intuitively suggests that I have a certain 
stubbornness about the implication claim, but I can have that without acting in accord 
with the relations among beliefs in q1, …, qn and p, respectively, that that implication 
dictates. In fact, getting a stubborn belief in the implication from the headline alone as 
suggested is a good way of imagining not properly acquiring the appreciation of the 
relations among beliefs that the implication imposes.  
Brueckner says that the reason I do not know the implication claim when I acquire 
it from the headline is that “I fail to see that q implies p, in that I fail to see the logical 
connection between q and p” (RKTR, #). This assumes a requirement that the subject 
appreciate the relation that is claimed between q and p, with appreciation defined as 
seeing, presumably in the metaphorical sense. My view requires that the subject 
appreciate that relation, with appreciation defined as having dispositions to manage 
beliefs in p and q in accord with it. The only difference, then, is in how we understand the 
needed appreciation. Brueckner claims that there is nothing “epistemic” about the 
conditions I require for knowledge of logical implication, so his complaint must be based 
on the difference between “seeing” and differential dispositions to believe. That is, the 
objection must assume that counterfactual conditions on belief cannot capture what is 
epistemic. One is free to make that assumption, of course, but it would make the current 
dispute unnecessary.  
Some may be uncomfortable with my externalist approach to knowledge of 
logical and other necessary truths, because none of these definitions require even access 
to reasons or understanding of why the logical truth is true. My definitions have 
sometimes been mis-cited as requiring the subject to be in a position to give an argument 
– perhaps because it is hard to believe anyone would leave that out of an account – and 
these intuitions may underlie Brueckner’s dissatisfaction with my view. I mean what I 
say, though, and there are several advantages to my approach. First, though the kinds of 
logical and mathematical truths discovered by researchers require explicit thought and 
proof if they are to become known, the majority of logical implications that are known by 
human beings are simple ones known by the man on the street, who would not be able to 
give an argument for them, and might not be able to formulate the general logical rules of 
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which his beliefs are instances. (Even the woman on the street might not be able to do 
these things.)5 Yet truths such as “If A and B then A” and the independence of the 
continuum hypothesis are truths of the same type, and we should expect there to be 
something similar in what it is to know them. Leaving out from the requirements the 
ability of the subject to prove the claim makes that possible.  
One might object that such externalist conditions as I have proposed cannot be 
nearly enough to explicate what it is for a mathematician to know a theorem. Such 
knowledge does require the proof, and the understanding that she acquires in that process. 
This claim appears correct but there is an ambiguity in the notion of requiring. 
Acquisition of knowledge requires proof in these sophisticated cases, but I am defining 
what it is to know, not what is required to attain that status. I do not take the process of 
coming to a belief as related in a necessary way to its status as knowledge. 
(Counterfactual conditions in general do not; they are current-time-slice-views, not 
historical views. The claim that I should have a historical view would require an 
argument on different grounds.) That process is obviously related in a contingent way to 
the status – it happens to be a psychological fact that some logical knowledge cannot be 
acquired by us except through explicit work – and this is enough to explain the intuition 
that it should be a requirement for having the knowledge. The objection is also right that 
proofs can yield deep understanding, but the state of understanding is different from the 
state of knowing.  
To take the availability of argument as a requirement on all knowledge of 
necessary truths would leave the man on the street little if any logical knowledge, and to 
split the two categories – ordinary vs. sophisticated – would fail to explain their 
similarity. It would also have awkward consequences for classification. The prooflessness 
of the mathematical wonder Srinivasa Ramanujan has apparently been exaggerated – the 
editors of his journals from the years in India say it is clear that he had proofs, and his not 
writing them down was due to the need to conserve paper. But even if all of the great 
mathematicians eventually, or quickly, were able to give proofs of the necessary truths 
they discovered, a view that requires that ability for knowledge is committed to there 
never being any moment at which a mathematician knows a theorem without that 
articulation ability, never, ironically, a pure “seeing” moment. The journals aside, there is 
a famous anecdote about Ramanujan, that when G. H. Hardy remarked that the number 
on the taxicab they were sharing was uninteresting he immediately informed his cabmate 
that the number 1729 was the smallest natural number representable in two different ways 
as a sum of two cubes. Of course he subsequently was able to prove the claim, and 
generalizations of it have become theorems about the “taxicab numbers,” but unless we 
stretch the notion of ability in an ad hoc way we are liable to be denying too much 
knowledge. 
Not all logical truths are implication claims, of course, but the relation of 
implication can guide us through the rest because of the distinctive fact about a logical 
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truth (in monotonic logics), that it is implied by every proposition in the language. To 
know non-implicational logical truth, r, then, I say that what we need to be responsive to 
in our belief behavior is this special relation r has to all other propositions. One does not 
have to know that r is implied by every proposition in order to know r – most people do 
not even have that belief. Rather it must be that there is no proposition such that one fails 
to appreciate the implication relation it has to r. It must not be that one might believe it 
and not believe r. That is, the proper way to be responsive to a (non-implicational) logical 
truth is to have a disposition to believe it come what may among one’s beliefs. 
Schematically, the conditions for this are: 
 
c’) For all q1, …, qn, P((–b(q1)  …  –b(qn)) / –b(r)) > w  1 
d’) For all q1, …, qn, P(b(r)) /(b(q1) . … . b(qn)) > x  1,6 
 
for w and x thresholds of error tolerance possessed by the evaluator. (See Roush 2005 for  
more detail.) If a subject knows r, then in a case where the subject did not believe r he 
would not believe anything, and when he does believe anything, he also believes r. 
This is not a requirement for responsiveness to the fact that r is true no matter 
what, but responsiveness to the relation r has to every proposition one might believe, and 
thus to the constraints on belief behavior the logical facts impose. The difference between 
a “come what may” phrasing and a “come what may among one’s beliefs” phrasing, is 
that the latter does not require you to be someone who would believe r even if you 
believed nothing else; the former does. The difference is not merely technical. It indicates 
that what being responsive to logical propositions requires is not principally a relation to 
how the world is as regards logic, but how whatever that truth is imposes requirements on 
the relations among one’s beliefs. This makes my view compatible with a non-realist 
view that logical truths are not so in virtue of the way the world is, but in virtue of 
something like convention, or the rules of language or the contours of human concepts. 
Whatever logical truths are, they impose constraints on belief of the sort I have described. 
The phrase “come what may” and the implicit invocation of Quine’s web of belief 
might prompt one to wonder whether the view can plausibly accommodate the fact, or 
view, that revision of logic could be justified. If in order to know the Law of Excluded 
Middle (LEM) one must have a disposition to believe it no matter what else one believes, 
then does it not follow that one could not count as knowing it if one might seriously 
consider an argument from L. E. J. Brouwer that this principle must be rejected? 
This does not follow, for interesting reasons. The dispositions that are required of 
one are expressed as conditional probabilities whose values must be above a certain level, 
w or x. Unless the threshold chosen is 1, knowing LEM allows for a probability of 1-x 
that you would give up that belief given other beliefs. It is legitimate to demand that the 
probability of your revising, 1-x, is small if we are to count you as knowing, and there are 
at least two ways of achieving that. If one were a researcher who dealt with arguments 
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about revision of logic on a regular basis then there is a high probability that one would 
consider changing one’s mind, but we would expect such a person not to be a push-over 
for arguments for radical views, and that keeps the probability of an actual change down. 
A person in the street not versed in logic might be someone inclined to naïve enthusiasm 
when presented with radical views, and so would be a pushover when presented with an 
alternative logic. But he can know LEM, or instances of it, even so, provided he is 
unlikely to come across or understand accounts of radical logics. As one becomes more 
and more disposed to changing one’s mind about LEM, perhaps due to increasing 
exposure to alternatives, one’s knowledge of it slips away too, on this view, even when 
one’s belief does not change. But this does not seem to conflict with intuitions because it 
is a process in which the robustness of one’s commitment erodes. 
A less realist view of logic, where logical truths are rather viewed roughly on the 
model of conventions, would bring an additional feature here. On such a view, if you are 
considering changing your belief in LEM, you are considering changing your language, 
for changing your logic at least implies this even if it is not identical to it. However, those 
circumstances of not believing LEM do not violate the conditions on knowing LEM. 
They would be scenarios in which you don’t believe LEM but you don’t have other 
beliefs either in the sense that concerns the conditional probability conditions on your 
current belief in LEM; what a belief is in that sense is conditioned by your current 
language. So c’ is fulfilled. And in all of the possible beliefs as defined for your current 
language, including logic, you do have the belief in LEM, so d’ is fulfilled. This is 
another place where the difference between belief come what may and belief come what 
may among your beliefs shows itself. 
Knowledge of necessary truths is fallible—you always might have made a 
mistake—but it has been difficult to incorporate fallibility in other theories of this kind of 
knowledge (Roush 2005, 134-6) because the proposition does not have the potential to be 
false. The view here avoids this problem because the responsiveness one must have is not 
to the difference between the truth and the impossible falsity of the logically true 
proposition, but to the relations each of these truths has to other propositions and to the 
relations they impose on groups of other propositions. The required dispositions are 
dispositions among your beliefs only – the question is not what one would do if the 
logically true proposition were false, but what one would do with one belief given one’s 
other beliefs or lack thereof. Most of us will take the parameters w and x to be less than 1 
in the conditions above – when we take them as 1 we are infallibilists and the challenge 
of creating a fallibilist theory does not arise – which means that the disposition that makes 
you count as appreciative or responsive need not guarantee that you avoid error in all 
possible circumstances.  
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III. Closure and the Growth of Error 
 Achieving closure via a recursion clause, such as the one above, where the 
requirements for knowledge of the implication are not infallibilist but have thresholds, 
has a problem with the growth of error that I did not deal with in my book. Suppose that I 
track q to degrees s and t and am responsive to degrees u and v to the fact that q implies 
q’. Let s, t, u and v each be less than 1. It follows from the definition that I know q’ 
although, because the thresholds are below 1, my potential error in my belief in q’ is 
higher than the potential error I have in my belief in q. The growth over one step may not 
be large enough for worry. (We will calculate actual values below.) However, now that I 
know q’ I can do the same thing for any q’’ that I know q’ implies, and this sequence can 
be continued indefinitely. It does not need to be carried on very far for me to be counted 
as knowing things for which my sensitivity is only 50%. The same is true of Goldman’s 
recursion clause. 
 What causes the runaway multiplication of potential error is not the allowance of 
knowledge by known implication but the recursion. However, we can reformulate the 
relevant clause of the view (see above, #) without the recursion by changing one word: 
 
S tracks p (fulfills (1) and (2)) 
or 
there are q1, …, qn, such that q1, …, qn together imply p, S knows that q1, …, qn 
imply p, and S tracks q1, …, qn. 
 
The difference occurs in changing the second “knows” to “tracks” in the second clause.7 
It is now not enough to know that p follows from something that you know follows from 
something that you know … follows from something that you track. You must instead be 
no more than one implicational step away from a proposition that you track if you are to 
count as knowing. This avoids the problem of counting a belief with any old degree of 
potential error knowledge, because it turns out that any designation of the number of 
allowed steps of known implication from a tracking belief puts strict limits on the growth 
of potential error, and implies a degree of preservation of sensitivity.  
 Calculating error over known implications in the way that will yield such results 
requires explicit definition of an assumption that the subject’s belief in p is based on her 
belief in q.8 This is a standard assumption in any closure clause because otherwise her 
belief in p is only accidentally related to the belief whose knowledge status closure says is 
supposed to give her a right to it. In that case there is no good reason to think that her 
knowledge of q is giving her knowledge of p. I define the basing relation using the 
following necessary condition: The belief in p is based on the belief in q only if  
 
P(–b(p)/ –b(q)) is high,  
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that is, only if you are unlikely to believe p given that you do not believe q. Fully 
generally, 
 
5) P(–b(p)/( –b(q1)  –b(q2)  ….  –b(qn))) > z  1. 
 
If this conditional probability were as high as 1 then your beliefs in q1, …, qn would be 
solely responsible for your belief in p.  
Note that this basing claim is not part of what is required to know that q1, …, qn 
imply p. Knowing that q1, …, qn imply p does not prevent you from also believing or 
being disposed to believe p on the basis of other beliefs that imply p. Rather, this is a 
claim of basing needed to formulate the closure requirements. In the closure question we 
are assuming that the only thing you have that might get you knowledge of p is your 
knowledge of q1, …, qn, because the question is whether the latter is sufficient. 
 To summarize the whole view, again schematically with regard to conditions 1, 2, 
3’, and 4’, S’s true belief in p is knowledge if and only if 
 
1)  P(–b(p)/ –p) > s, where s  1,  (sensitivity to p) 
and 
2)  P(b(p)∕p) > t, where t  1,  (adherence to p) 
 
or  
there are q1, …, qn such that q1, …, qn together imply p, S believes that they do, 
and for every q  {q1, …, qn} S fulfills 1 and 2, that is, 
P(–b(q)/ –q) > s,   (sensitivity to every premise) 
and 
P(b(q)/q) > t,    (adherence to every premise) 
and 
S fulfills 3’ and 4’ for q1, …, qn , that is, 
3’)  P((–b(q1)  …  –b(qn))/ –b(p))  >  u   1,  
(implication sensitivity) 
and 
4’)  P(b(p)/(b(q1) . … . b(qn))) >  v   1 
(implication adherence) 
 and 
S fulfills 5 for q1, …, qn, , that is, 
5) P(–b(p)/(–b(q1)  –b(q2)  ….  –b(qn))) > z  1   
(basing b(p) on b(q1), …, b(qn)) 
  or the number of steps of known basing implication is m > 1. 
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For reasons I discuss below, the number of premises and number of steps of known 
implication also affect the growth of potential error, so m and n also depend on the error 
tolerances of the evaluator in a way that we will see. 
If I fulfill all of the clauses beyond “or” in the definition just given, what can we 
say about the sensitivity of my belief in p? What is the probability I do not believe p 
given that p is false? Information sufficient to determine this is given by the fact that q1, 
…, qn together imply p, my sensitivity to the q1, …, qn, and the basing of my belief in p 
on my beliefs in q1, …, qn. First using a single premise q for simplicity, by total 
probability, 
 
P(–b(p)/ –p) = P(–b(q)/ –p)P(–b(p)/ –b(q). –p) + P(b(q)/ –p)P(–b(p)/b(q).–p). 
  
By the fact that –p implies –q, the right hand side is greater than or equal to  
 
P(–b(q)/ –q)P(–b(p)/ –b(q). –q) + P(b(q)/ –q)P(–b(p)/b(q). –q). 
 
The terms here involve sensitivity to q, basing, and implication adherence, thus: 
 
(>s)(>z) + (< (1-s))(< (1-v)). 
 
Taking all thresholds as .95, this becomes: 
 
(>.95)(>.95) + (<.05)(<.05) > .90. 
 
In general, for one-step, one-premise known implications, P(–b(p)/ –p) > sz. Although 
level of adherence to the implication, v, occurs in the equation it has no impact on our 
question of a minimum because the second term in which v occurs is composed of 
maxima. If one’s level of sensitivity to q is s, then one’s level of sensitivity to some p that 
one knows follows from q is diminished from s only by the level of deviation from 
perfect basing. If your belief in q is truly the only basis for your belief in p, then no 
potential error is introduced at all; sensitivity is fully preserved over the known 
implication. In general, for m-step, one-premise known implications, the preserved 
sensitivity level, P(–b(p)/ –p), is szm. Thus, for 2 steps and all thresholds set at .95, P(–
b(p)/ –p) is .86, for three steps .81. 
 Multiple-premise closure brings further error considerations. Each premise known 
fallibly contributes potential error, so the potential error in the resulting belief in p is 
greater than it would have been with fewer premises. The question is how much greater. 
Taking the next case, two-premise implication, we want to know the minimum level of 
sensitivity one will have to p if one is counted as knowing it by tracking each of q1 and q2, 
knowing that they together imply p, and basing one’s belief in p on them. This can be 
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calculated as follows. Because –p implies –q, which implies –q1  –q2, the latter, call it A, 
becomes the condition in all of the conditional probabilities: 
 
P(–b(p)/ –p) = P((–b(q1). –b(p). –b(q2))/A) + P((–b(q1). –b(p).b(q2))/A)  
+ P((b(q1). –b(p). –b(q2))/A) +P((b(q1). –b(p).b(q2))/A). 
 
The last term is 0 since P(b(q1).b(q2)/ (–b(q1)  –b(q2))) is 0. Rewriting each remaining 
summand, 
 
P(–b(p)/ –p) = P(–b(p)/( –b(q1). –b(q2)))P(–b(q1). –b(q2)/ A)  
+ P(–b(p)/ –b(q1).b(q2))P(–b(q1).b(q2)/A)  
+ P(–b(p)/b(q1). –b(q2))P(b(q1). –b(q2)/A)  
 
For the moment I will assume that when –q1  –q2 is the case it is equally likely to be (–
q1.–q2), (–q1 .q2), or (q1. –q2). The first term is determined by basing and sensitivity to 
each of q1 and q2 and equals: 
 
zs2/3 = (.95)(.95)(.95)/3 = .2869 
 
The second term is determined by basing, sensitivity to q1, and adherence to q2, and 
equals: 
 
zst/3 = (.95)(.95)(.95)/3 = .286 
 
The third term is symmetric to this one and also equals .286. Thus we have that the 
sensitivity to p that results from knowing it in the way imagined is at least .86. That 
amounts to 4% less fidelity than with one-premise (one-step) implication. 
 In general, for one-step, two-premise closure, for the conclusion-belief in p, 
 
P(–b(p)/-p) = azs2 + bzst + czts 
 
where a = P(–q1.–q2/(–q1  –q2)), b = P(–q1 .q2/(–q1  –q2)), and c = P(q1. –q2/(–q1  –q2)). 
In this calculation I made the assumption that a = b = c. But it turns out that the values of 
a, b, and c make very little difference if z, s, and t are all high (as they will be in the cases 
of interest), because the terms by which a, b, and c are multiplied are then close to equal, 
and a + b + c = 1. For example, if in an attempt to minimize the lower bound on 
sensitivity of our belief in p we take a = .90, b = .05, c = .05, then as long as we keep s, t, 
and z the same at .95, P(–b(p)/ –p) = zs2 = .86, the same as when a = b = c. Thus, in the 
cases where if at least one of q1 or q2 is false one of them is vastly more likely than the 
other to be the false proposition, it need not make any difference to the growth of error. 
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For the general case of n premises and one step of known implication, and if s is 
approximately equal to t, the preserved sensitivity in the conclusion, p, P(–b(p)/ –p), is 
greater than approximately zsn.10 
What will be a problem for some is the fact that getting lower bounds on 
sensitivity of the conclusion-belief in the multiple-premise implication case depends 
crucially on t, the subject’s adherence to q1 and to q2, as it did not in the one-premise 
case. The renaissance of interest in the sensitivity condition has not been accompanied by 
enthusiasm for Nozick’s adherence condition (except in my case), but it makes a 
difference in minimizing the growth of error. If one endorsed sensitivity but not 
adherence, then one would not have general error-control with more than one-premise 
closure. 
 
IV. Explanation Of Closure 
Brueckner objects to the recursion clause that I used in the book to impose 
closure, that it does not explain why knowledge would be preserved under known 
implication. It just stipulates that it is. However, judging by the standard Brueckner sets 
with the examples of views he thinks do bring with them an explanation of closure, I have 
to disagree. He has us consider an evidentialist view: 
 
I have good evidence e for q, and I correctly deduce p from q. On what basis do I 
then know p? An evidentialist can answer that if one has adequate justifying 
evidence E for φ, and φ implies ψ, then E is also adequate justifying evidence for 
ψ. This explains how it is that I can know p on the basis of my deduction of p 
from q: my evidence e for q puts me in a position to know the implied p.   (RKTR, 
#) 
 
If E is evidence for φ, and φ implies ψ, then E is also evidence for ψ. Why should we 
think this? What is the understanding of evidence that would make it true? The question 
is not trivial since the definition of evidential support as probabilistic relevance makes it 
false. The claim is called the special consequence condition, and it is arguably false even 
on an intuitive notion of evidential support, as illustrated by examples of φ that are 
conjunctions with independent conjuncts.11 Even if there is a notion of evidence that 
makes this claim true, though, it is not obviously so. Citation of a claim very much in 
need of defense and explanation is hardly an explanation. 
 I agree with Brueckner that Goldman’s reliabilist view is explanatory of closure. 
Probably the reason Brueckner thinks this is that the notion of a reliable process figures in 
the recursion clause. Although deduction does not preserve reliability level it is itself a 
(conditionally) reliable process, so even with the addition of the recursion clause justified 
belief remains predicated upon the concept of reliability. Where I disagree with 
Brueckner is his implied denial that my view has the same explanatory structure. Just as 
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conditional reliability of a process is not the same as reliability of the process but is 
conceptually analogous, responsiveness to logical implication is not the same as but is 
conceptually analogous to sensitivity as defined for empirical truths. They are both 
responsiveness to truths in the way that the nature of the truth in question calls for. Why 
should two concatenated responsiveness relations yield a relation we should take as 
making a belief knowledge when the level of responsiveness of the concatenation will be 
somewhat degraded? Why should we have taken the analogous concatenation of reliable 
and conditionally reliable processes to preserve knowledge, as Brueckner seems to think 
we should, when the level of reliability was degraded?12  
Thus, my original view had no more problem explaining closure than other views 
have. It had no more of a problem of endorsing cheap knowledge either. It counted me as 
knowing I am not a brain in a vat provided only that I tracked my hand and knew that this 
implied I was not envatted. But the principle Brueckner gives us that ensures evidentialist 
justified belief is closed has the same problem: It implies that having evidence that one 
has a hand combined with valid deduction of unenvattedness from the evidence gives one 
evidence that one is not envatted, because according to the principle, the evidence that 
you have a hand is evidence for what follows from your handedness. It does not seem that 
any of us has evidence that he is unenvatted.13 
All that said, my view, like the others, did have problems in these areas. The claim 
I want to defend now is that the new closure clause resolves both of them in one stroke. 
My original closure clause (and Goldman’s) suffered from the uncontrolled error 
problem, and this is the source, I think, of the sense that closure has been imposed but not 
explained. But an uncontrolled error problem is also the source of puzzlement about how 
knowledge itself could be closed. Why else do we pause at the idea that we know it is not 
a cleverly disguised mule merely by knowing that it is a zebra, except that what gives us 
apparent knowledge that it is a zebra does nothing to protect us against the error entailed 
by the presence of a cleverly disguised mule? Similarly with cheap knowledge; why else 
would we be surprised that we could know we are not envatted by knowing that we have 
a hand than that what makes us count as knowing the latter does nothing to protect against 
the error that envattedness would represent? 
Because my new template for closure clauses addresses the error problem, it also 
relieves us of the other two problems in a novel way. Clauses of the new sort will make a 
theory closed in one sense, but not in another.  Starting with the latter, the change from 
“knows” to “is sensitive to” means that the following standard formulation of closure is 
not fulfilled: 
 
If S knows q, knows that q implies p, and believes p on the basis of these things, 
then S knows p. 
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If we accept one-step closure, though, with thresholds matching our error-tolerances for 
knowledge, the following weaker kind of claim is true: 
 
If S is sensitive to q, knows that q implies p, and believes p on the basis of these 
things, then S knows p. 
 
The stronger claim can be achieved by a recursion clause only on pain of the snowballing 
error problem. However, when intuitive arguments are given in favor of closure, the 
supporting examples involve no more than one known implication and are not direct 
evidence of a recursion. This and the fact that the growth of potential error is controlled in 
the new view, makes this new kind of closure clause seem to me to capture well what is 
intuitively right about the claim that knowledge is closed. It is a bonus that we now also 
know how to define clauses allowing m steps and multiple premises in a way that 
maintains a specified maximum of potential error and minimum of sensitivity in the 
conclusion belief. 
  The consequences of this shift in attention are distinctive. I have not given a 
closed theory of knowledge with sensitivity as a necessary condition. However, it follows 
from what we have just seen that for every level of sensitivity, y, there is a disjunctive 
theory with a sensitivity condition using a threshold greater than y and a one-step, single-
premise closure clause, that will ensure that no belief whose sensitivity is below y will 
count as knowledge.  The condition that tells you how to find such a theory is: sz > y. 
There are many such theories, with varying values for s and z, and there are also all of the 
theories for multiple-step, single premise known implications where szm > y, and 
similarly for multiple-premise known implications where zsn > y. For every theory 
fulfilling my conditions with sensitivity as a necessary condition, and so with knowledge 
not closed, there is a theory fulfilling my conditions that is at least as strong in the 
sensitivity requirement and according to which knowledge is closed in the weaker sense 
stated above. 
One can make knowledge as expensive as one likes with regard to sensitivity, and 
still maintain a kind of closure. But have we have trivialized what it is for a theory to take 
knowledge as closed? The point of adding a closure clause to a theory by brute force was 
to make the knowledge concept more permissive. But if a definition requires a belief to 
have sensitivity > s in order to count as knowledge, then we add nothing to the extension 
of the concept if we disjoin this condition with one describing a belief that the subject 
inferred from a belief that has sensitivity > r = s/z. That belief by inference counts as 
knowledge because we chose the threshold r so that the resulting belief would achieve 
sensitivity >s! The ability to define and calculate error control over steps of inference 
does not need to change the extension of the concept of knowledge; what the bounds on 
the growth of error allow us to do is identify a multiplicity of types of inferences – 
in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 242-268. 
 
17 
 
permutations of values of s, t, m, n, and z – that will yield knowledge of a given 
sensitivity.  
This analysis does somewhat undercut the interest of the closure problem in the 
form of a yes-no question – closure or not? – but that is a side-effect of addressing the 
problem that I think makes the yes-no question persist. Examples can be found where 
known implication does seem to preserve knowledge and where it disastrously fails, and 
we are at a loss to see a principled way of identifying the former without stepping into the 
abyss of the latter. Both sorts of examples are logical implications, after all. I say the 
principled way to draw lines is in terms of potential error, and I have shown how to define 
closure clauses so that they won’t yield the unpleasant surprise of a forced choice 
between cheap knowledge and skepticism. If that problem disappears though, one might 
wonder, could these really be closure clauses? I say they are because they explain to us 
how and why we can accept knowledge by inference not piecemeal but across the (error-
defined) board of our choice. They give us what is essential to the idea of closure, 
namely, that we can accept a case as knowledge by known implication from a sensitive 
belief while knowing nothing more than that error thresholds were met on the initial 
belief and the basing relation. And we won’t have any surprises about the sensitivity of 
the conclusion-belief. 
 
V. Logical Implication: Tough, Not Cheap  
Brueckner’s complaint about the bruteness of my imposition of closure occurs 
within an objection to the consequences of my view for brain-in-a-vat skepticism. The 
premise-belief of the skeptical argument – I have a hand, say – is sensitive, but the 
conclusion-belief – I am not a brain in a vat – is not. Why should we think that the latter 
is knowledge? With the results I just derived about error the skeptical case becomes even 
more puzzling. How can it be that sensitivity is largely preserved in one-step deductive 
inferences, as I just argued a priori, when in the skeptical case we get in one step from a 
premise and an inference with as much sensitivity as you like to a conclusion with 
maximum potential error? 
In fact neither my original recursive closure clause nor my new closure template 
implies that it is possible to know you are not a brain in a vat just in virtue of knowing 
you have a hand and knowing that unenvattedness follows. This is because in this 
skeptical case the familiar implication claim is false; false claims cannot be known so the 
premises of the closure clauses are not fulfilled.  
That I have a hand does not imply that I am not a brain in a vat because I could be 
a brain in a vat with a hand. One might think this is cute – smart undergraduates say it 
regularly – but merely a verbal trick. Of course one might still be a brain in a vat with a 
hand. The point was that one could not be a handless brain in a vat if one has a hand. 
However, though that does give us an implication it is not one that holds any surprises 
that a skeptic could exploit. If you know that you have a hand then you know that you are 
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not a handless anything. I claim that any attempt to repair the lack of implication between 
these two claims is doomed to fail, and have argued this elsewhere (Roush 2010b). 
Strengthening the antecedent sufficiently to get the implication means that supposing we 
know it is supposing we know a lot, plenty enough, on intuitive grounds independent of 
commitments about closure, to know we are not brains in vats. Weakening the conclusion 
to where it is implied by having a hand similarly gives us no surprise that a skeptic could 
take advantage of; knowing what the deduction lets you know in that case is not knowing 
much. The lack of implication in the skeptical case means that my closure clauses do not 
imply something that they cannot explain. 
Logical implication is mercifully unforgiving, something I noticed in the context 
of skepticism only after writing the book, but had noticed in the book in the context of 
lottery propositions. That I will not have large sums of money tomorrow – something 
people think I know – doesn’t imply that I won’t win the lottery today. I could win and 
promptly be robbed, in whatever sense is needed to relieve me of money in an electronic 
age – perhaps the girl with the dragon tattoo hacks into the lottery company’s account. 
The usual response to this point is a casual remark to the effect that an example that did 
involve implication could be constructed. However, I argued in the book that this is not 
so, because of the same kind of trade-off just described for the skeptical case. Brueckner 
agrees about the trade-off for the lottery case, so I will leave it at that.  
Brueckner wrongly thinks there is an asymmetry, though, between my treatment 
of literal lotteries, and the kind of lotteries discussed by Jonathan Vogel (1990). Surely I 
know that my car is parked in the F-lot – I parked it – but I do not know it wasn’t stolen 
while I was sitting in my office for these many hours, even though the latter follows. The 
same point is true with this case as with the lottery: The implication does not hold 
because, for example, my car could still be in the F-lot while having been stolen, re-
stolen, and returned to its original place. I don’t have to know my car wasn’t stolen in 
order to know it is parked in the F-lot, because the former does not follow from the latter. 
Similarly, I don’t have to know I won’t win the lottery in order to know what I do seem to 
know, that I won’t have large sums of money tomorrow, because that I won’t have lots of 
money tomorrow doesn’t imply that I won’t win the lottery today. I do know that my car 
was probably not stolen, though, because this I track. The probable scenarios in which it 
was probably stolen  – such as that the theft rate is very high in the F-lot  – are also 
scenarios where I wouldn’t believe it was probably not stolen. I claim the analogous thing 
in the literal lottery. Intuitively, I do know that I will probably not win the lottery, and the 
sensitivity condition explains this: If I were not probably going to lose I would not 
believe I was probably going to lose. 
Logical implication is tough. It must be that there is no possible circumstance in 
which the premises are true and the conclusion false. It is distinct from any induction with 
however so many instances one might induce from, and, as I made clear in the book, I do 
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not allow a closure clause for induction. Brueckner finds the implications of this for the 
bootstrapping argument strange. I find his objections unpersuasive.   
The familiar bootstrapping argument (Vogel 2000) has me sitting in the driver’s 
seat of my car with no reason to trust my gas gauge. I engage in the follow procedure: I 
look at my gauge and form the belief that it has a certain reading, say “F”, and on the 
basis of what it says I form the belief that my gas tank has the amount of gas the reading 
indicated. I conjoin those two beliefs. I do this, and nothing else, n times, and now I have 
a list of beliefs in conjunctions. As Brueckner writes it: 
 
 1. My gauge says ‘F’ & the tank is full. 
 2. My gauge says ‘1/2 F’ & the tank is half-full. 
 3. My gauge says ‘F’ & the tank is full. 
4. My gauge says ‘1/4 F’ & the tank is one-quarter-full. 
    . 
    . 
    . 
n. My gauge says ‘3/4 F’ & the tank is three-quarters-full.  
 
From 1 I infer that my gauge was accurate on occasion 1, since a match between what it 
says and what is the case is what accuracy amounts to. I do this for each of 1 through n 
and now have many beliefs of the form “My gauge was accurate on occasion m,” for 
many distinct m. I infer from all of these instances that: 
 
 C: My gauge is reliable. 
Clearly this inference does not yield knowledge of its conclusion. I claim that I do not 
know C in this way because I do not track it: If my gauge were not reliable I would still 
believe it is because of the silly procedure I am using. If the gauge reading often did not 
match the gas level in the tank, that is, if it were not reliable, I would still believe it is 
reliable. A lack of sensitivity is what is wrong with the fact that I am not checking the 
accuracy of the gauge except by consulting the gauge. 
Brueckner finds this strange, apparently because I am sensitive to the conjuncts in 
the premises14 and we can make n as large as we like; what then is the reason for 
distinguishing this inference over many instances from a bona fide deduction and 
applying the closure clause? He compares the argument here that I say does not yield 
knowledge of the conclusion to an argument of a neighbor that could be written down 
with the same sentences but in which he gets his beliefs by checking the actual level of 
gas in the tank when he comes to believe the second conjunct in each premise. Brueckner 
finds it strange that there are two arguments with exactly the same conclusion beliefs and 
premise beliefs and that it follows from my view that my argument does not yield 
knowledge whereas my neighbor’s does yield knowledge. I would have thought that is 
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exactly the consequence one would want a view to have about these cases, since the 
neighbor does know and I do not. It is evident from the example itself, and not some 
quirk in my view, that the reason for this difference will not be found in the sentences 
written on the paper. 
Intuitively, the reason the neighbor knows that the gauge is reliable is that he has 
checked the level of the tank through another means than the gauge. This feature of his 
procedure also has the implication that he is sensitive to the reliability of the gauge. In 
case the gauge is not reliable chances are good – and better the higher the n – that 
mismatches will show up between what the gauge says and what the neighbor comes to 
believe is the level of the tank, because he is investigating the latter by an additional 
method. The neighbor knows because he tracks. I don’t know because I don’t track. 
It is very neat when the consequences of a theory match intuitions, but am I 
arbitrarily distinguishing an induction of n instances – n very, very large – from a 
deduction? What is the big difference between deduction and a very strong induction? I 
think a closure clause for induction must be rejected because of the same issues about 
growth of error that I dealt with above in re-formulating the closure clause for deduction. 
There we were able to derive strict upper bounds on the amount of error that taking a 
merely known-to-be-implied belief as knowledge would give us. With induction we will 
not be able to derive a reasonable upper bound on error.  
One might think that the only difference between the deductive and inductive 
cases is the strength of the support of the conclusion by the premises. Every term in the 
evaluation above depended on the fact that q implies p in order to change the condition   –
p in P(–b(p)/ –p) to the condition –q, so that the sensitivity to q could do its work. But we 
would expect of a good induction that its evidence, q, made its conclusion, p, probable, 
say P(p/q) > .95, so would we not just change a 1 for a .95 in every term in that move 
from –p to –q? Changing 1 to .95 even in four terms would not make a devastating 
difference. However, this is not the only change that would have to happen. The problem 
is that an induction must use many pieces of evidence if it is to establish a strong support 
relation, and although we saw that having two premises rather than one reduced the 
sensitivity we got for p only by 3-4 percent with the deductive closure clause, 30 pieces 
of data would make for 30 premises and bring us to no sensitivity at all. And 30 is a small 
data set. 
But suppose for a moment that our thresholds were high enough that a 30-premise 
implication would not lose more than 5% sensitivity, and suppose that it was possible for 
human beings to be squeaky clean enough to fulfill those thresholds with the right kind of 
effort. An inductive closure clause would still not count the inference to the reliability of 
the gas gauge as giving knowledge. A key part of the reason that sensitivity transmits to a 
degree over known deductive implication was the sensitivity the subject is required to 
have to each of the premises. The inductive closure clause would have this requirement 
too. However, the premises of the inference to the reliability of the gauge are claims of 
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accuracy of the gauge, and the subject is not sensitive to such claims. If the gauge were 
not accurate on a given occasion, that is, if the reading the subject saw did not match the 
actual gas level, the subject would still believe it was accurate, since she is not checking 
the actual level. This is true for all of the occasions, and so, premises.15 
An inductive closure clause would be either pointless – because one or two 
premises rarely give strong support – or disastrous – because a sufficient number of 
premises, and feasible thresholds, would leave us without any sensitivity to the 
conclusion proposition.  And it wouldn’t help to undercut my conclusions about the gas 
gauge in any case. 
There is another apparent problem of cheap knowledge by known implication that 
my view does not fall prey to. Conjunctions appear problematic because the conjuncts 
may have properties as different as you like. In a case where if the conjunction were to be 
false the most similar worlds all have the one false and the other true, and the one that 
would be false the subject tracks but the other conjunct she does not track, then she 
counts as sensitive to the conjunction without being sensitive to one of the conjuncts. If 
this is combined with a closure clause, then it looks like she can know the conjunct she is 
not sensitive to at all by knowing it is implied by the conjunction (Roush 2005, 110-112). 
The same kind of argument can be imagined against conditional-probability tracking, so it 
is important to see how my views avoid this. 
Obviously, it follows from the results I explained in the previous section that 
cheap knowledge cannot be had by known implication and basing from a belief that is 
sensitive, so how does my theory manage to avoid the conjunction problem? First, my 
theory (old or new) does not allow that a person is sensitive to many conjunctions of this 
type, because of conditions that are responsible for the qualifier “schematically” above. 
The tracking conditions in my theory are quantifications over the class of all probability 
functions on the language of evaluation. The familiar conditional probabilities (1 and 2) 
must be true in a subclass of that class, a subclass constrained by conditions that tell us 
which propositions are to have their probability values fixed in the evaluation (Roush 
2005, 76-93). They give an answer, for every sentence, whether the value for its 
corresponding proposition is to be fixed or variable. They are designed to let vary, for 
example for sensitivity, those matters that are more affected by –p than –p is affected by 
them because what we expect the subject to be able to pick up on is the difference that –p 
makes to the world.16 It turns out, though I had not anticipated it, that these conditions 
restrict the possibility of fulfilling the sensitivity condition for a conjunction where one 
conjunct, A, is more likely than the other, B, to be false if the conjunction is false. In 
many of those cases the logical properties of conjunctions force the conjuncts to get fixed 
and the sensitivity condition for the conjunction is undefined.17   
Fortunately the sieve is not too restrictive, in that it does allow the possibility of 
sensitivity to a conjunction in cases where P(–A/– (A.B))  P(–B/– (A.B)). This is a good 
thing since it should be possible to be sensitive to generalizations with lots of instances of 
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the same type and to propositions like “It is a black house.” But in that case sensitivity to 
the conjunction requires tracking of each conjunct. One has to be sensitive to each 
conjunct at a somewhat higher level than the set threshold in order to give the 
conjunction-belief threshold sensitivity, however not at as high a level as would be 
needed if one tracked each conjunct and did a multiple-premise deductive inference to the 
conjunction. Also, unlike preservation of sensitivity over multiple-premise deduction, no 
fulfillment of the adherence condition is required for this sensitivity to the conjunction. 
The fixing conditions would seem to be right to allow some exceptions where it is 
possible to track a conjunction without tracking a conjunct that is very unlikely to be false 
if the conjunction is false, by the same fallibilism that says we don’t have to be disposed 
to respond properly to every logically possible scenario in which p is false in order to be 
counted as knowing p, but only to the probable –p scenarios. It would be arbitrary to rule 
out the one entirely while being committed to the other. But if there are exceptions to the 
fixing conditions, then how do I avoid the problem of the cheap knowledge of a conjunct 
one is not sensitive to that can be derived from a conjunction one is sensitive to? 
Obviously, it follows from the results I just explained that knowledge of a proposition one 
is grossly insensitive to cannot be had by known implication and basing from a belief that 
is sensitive, so how does my theory manage to avoid the conjunction problem?       
 Interestingly, it is because the basing condition that my type of clause requires for 
closure is not fulfilled for the subject’s belief in the proposition she is insensitive to, 
because of that insensitivity. This can be proved from the definitions since in order for the 
subject’s belief in, say, B, to be based on her belief in the conjunction A.B, it must be that 
P(–b(B)/ –b(A.B)) is above threshold z.18 But she must be sensitive to B to fulfill this, and 
she is not. Indeed the less sensitive she is to B, the less she fulfills basing, and the 
intuitively strong counterexamples involve gross insensitivity. Thus, one cannot cheaply 
know a conjunct one is insensitive to via the new type of closure clause discussed above. 
 
VI. Taking Stock 
Any time one uses a sensitivity condition that is not infallibilist, there will be 
varying strengths of sensitivity. Since the level of sensitivity makes a difference to how 
epistemically sound the belief is, I keep track of the expected degrees via variables for 
thresholds. (It is an advantage of conditional probability over counterfactuals that these 
degrees can be expressed so directly.) Once this is done, then because probability is an 
axiom system the behavior of error over known implication can be calculated. The results 
of these calculations allow us to know the error consequences of any level of closure 
clause we might accept, and are surprisingly reassuring about how quickly (or rather, 
slowly) error grows. This in turn allows us to avoid all sorts of cheap knowledge 
problems, and even brain-in-a-vat skepticism. The closure problem is really an error 
problem.  
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1 I think that safety as a necessary condition does achieve closure automatically, without a 
recursion clause, despite recent arguments to the contrary. When the subject’s belief in 
the conclusion is based on her belief in the premise, the worlds in which the subject 
believes the conclusion of the implication are a natural subset of the worlds in which she 
believes the premise. If so then the conclusion belief is as true as the premise belief that 
implies it. This automatic closure leads to a cheap knowledge problem, though. 
2 In what follows I will largely ignore the adherence condition or, when it makes no 
difference, let it tag along by using “tracking” interchangeably with “sensitivity,” but the 
adherence condition remains part of my theory. It does make an important difference, 
below, in preservation of sensitivity in multiple-premise closure clauses, and in Roush 
2010a. 
3 I can no longer see why I required that none of the q1, …, qn be equivalent to q in my 
original formulation of this condition, but of course I might have been right there and 
wrong here. 
4 For this reason I expressed doubt about whether we should even have the belief clause 
in the definition of knowledge of implication (Roush 2005, 47).  
5 Even logicians have a hard time giving a non-circular proof of the simplest logical 
truths. 
6 Though I have used the same labels, c’ and d’, as I used in the book, these are much 
simplified, and therefore not fully correct, versions of those conditions. 
7 A similar change is made for knowledge of necessary truths known by known 
implication from knowledge of other necessary truths. The beliefs in the premises of such 
an argument would have to fulfill the “sensitivity” requirements for knowledge of non-
implicational necessary truths, c’ and d’ above. 
8 It is such an obvious assumption that I actually left it out in my definition in the book. It 
was not clear to me then how crucial it is to the calculation of growth of potential error. 
9 To simplify the presentation I have made use of the fact that P(–b(q1). –bq2)/A) = P(–
b(q1). –b(q2)/ –q1. –q2)P(–q1. –q2/A) = P(–b(q1). –b(q2)/ –q1. –q2)(1/3) and similarly for 
the other terms. Note that we are given in the assumptions only that we track one qn at a 
time, so we have two sensitivity contributions in the term just cited. 
10 Precisely, the sensitivity for three-premise one-step deduction azs3 + bzst2 + … + gzs2t, 
where a + b + … + g = 1. Ignoring the small contribution of differences between a, b, c, 
…, g in case s and t are different, it is zs3/7 + 3zst2/7 + 3zs2t/7. For n premises, the precise 
expression is a1zsn + a2zsn-1t + … + anzstn-1. 
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11 An example from Elliott Sober (handout): The hypothesis that an overturned card is the 
jack of hearts entails that the card will be a jack, but if you learn that the card is red that 
does not provide support to the claim that it is a jack.   
12 I take the safety condition to be explanatory for the same reason, that deduction is a 
safe process. But I think that safety achieves closure without a closure clause. This makes 
closure natural and adds further explanatory force. However, it comes at a price since the 
view thereby counts as knowledge cases with vast potential error, e.g., a belief that one is 
not a brain in a vat. The closure is achieved automatically because of a complete 
disregard for false positive error. 
13 Safety’s automatic closure also yields a cheap knowledge problem since if my hand-
belief is safe then it follows automatically that my belief I am not envatted is safe. (And 
this latter conforms with intuitions under the assumption of the safety of the premise.) We 
balk at the idea that that is enough for knowledge, though, illustrating that safety, as 
technically defined, is not enough for knowledge. 
14 I track the second conjuncts because the gauge is assumed actually to be reliable. The 
issue is whether I know that it is. 
15 This feature did not come up in my original presentation in the book because the 
closure clause was recursive. 
16 The conditions also determine whether methods are fixed; so, methods are not always 
fixed, but one common situation where the conditions imply they are is where whether 
that method was used is independent of the truth value of p. Nozick’s case of a father of 
an accused criminal does not, which I say is a good thing (Roush 2005, 68-71, 112-113). 
The conditions also imply that the random fabricator’s method is fixed at what it is on the 
occasions when she actually uses her eyes, as I did not notice in the book (Roush 2005, 
127-8).  
17 The theory (Roush 2005, 76-93) says that if a proposition, A, satisfies the following 
two conditions, together called “*”, then it is fixed in the evaluation of sensitivity:  
|P(A/–p) - P(A/p)|  |P(–p/A) - P(–p/–A)| and  
|P(–A/–p) - P(–A/p)|  |P(–p/A) - P(–p/–A)|,  
where p is the proposition that may or may not be known. Now, if p is a conjunction A.B, 
then the conditions for a conjunct, A, being fixed are:  
|P(A/– (A.B)) - P(A/(A.B))|  |P(– (A.B)/A) - P(–(A.B)/ –A)| and  
|P(–A/– (A.B)) - P(–A/(A.B))|  |P(– (A.B)/A) - P(–(A.B)/ –A|. 
Due to the logical relations between conjunctions and their conjuncts both conditions 
become: 
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P(–A/–(A.B))  P(B) 
If both A and B (switching places with A) get fixed in this way then the sensitivity 
condition, with –(A.B) in the condition, is undefined. There are cases where one or 
another of these is violated, for example when either A or B, or both, have very low 
probability. However, if either conjunct has very high probability, e.g., “I will not win the 
lottery tomorrow,” then they are fulfilled, so the theory does not let one know that 
without tracking it. 
18 P(–b(B)/ –b(A.B)) = P(–b(B)/ –B)P(–B/–b(A.B)) 
